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ARTICLE 
BALANCING PRINCIPLES IN JUDICIAL 
ADJUDICATION: 
THE GAPS OF RATIONALITY IN THE CONVICTION OF 
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
Lcia Vicente* 
ABSTRACT 
Weighing principles and considering rules in the context of 
judicial adjudication to create a general theory of State and Law is a 
challenge of hermeneutics that the Author makes. To meet this 
challenge the Author uses a decision of an administrative court in 
Portugal - the Tribunal Administrativo Central Norte. The fact-
pattern of that decision involved a foreign citizen living illegally in 
the country. While illegally residing in the country, that citizen was 
a victim of a crime of bodily harm. She complained to the police. The 
police asked her for her passport to proceed with the claim. They 
realized she was Brazilian and that she was residing illegally in the 
country. Consequently, rather than proceeding with the complaint, 
the police activated the process of expulsion of the foreign citizen 
from the country for she was an illegal resident. A judge confirmed 
the order of expulsion. That foreign citizen filed an action for an 
injunction to stop the order of expulsion from being enforced. In this 
context, must or must not a judge within the trial of an action for an 
injunction confirm the decision of expulsion of a foreign citizen who 
is illegally in the country, but who was a victim of a crime of bodily 
harm? This case resonates with many other reported cases all over 
the world involving illegal immigrants, their children, and their 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center. 
The Author writes this text in the loving memory of Ant6nio Manuel Hespanha. She thanks 
him and Manuel Atienza for helpful comments to an earlier version of this text. All 
translations into Portuguese language are free translations. All mistakes remain the 
Author's own. 
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families who face harsh judgments. For the judge, the challenge 
inherent in these cases is to balance fundamental rights in light of 
constitutional principles to avoid disproportionate solutions. 
Principles are measured up and scaled down; but ultimately, every 
citizen, illegally staying in a country or not, is lifted by their human 
dignity and that cannot be disregarded. 
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Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. [... ] 
Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are 
taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject 
to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. 
John Rawls' 
1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1999). 
2020] BALANCING PRINCIPLES 1009 
L INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
A judgment of an administrative court in Portugal-Tribunal 
Administrativo Central Norte2 -dismissed the appeal from the 
decision of an Administrative and Tax Court-Tribunal 
Administrativo e Fiscal de Penafiel-filed by a Brazilian citizen. The 
appealed decision had dismissed the action for an injunction filed 
by that Brazilian citizen. The action for an injunction was meant to 
suspend the administrative act ordered by the General Director of 
the Portuguese Immigration and Border Services, determining the 
expulsion of that Brazilian citizen from Portugal. This citizen was 
an illegal immigrant in the Portuguese territory. While she was 
illegally staying in the country, she was a victim of a crime of bodily 
harm. Notwithstanding the analysis of the arguments used by the 
court throughout the judgment,3 the central question of this Article 
is the following. In the event that a foreign citizen who illegally 
resides in the country is a victim of a crime of bodily harm and for 
that reason files a complaint with the police, should or should not 
a court, within an action for an injunction (and in an appeal against 
the lower court's decision) uphold the administrative decision to 
expel that illegal immigrant from the country? This scenario 
unfolds a conflict between the constitutional principle of equality 
between foreign citizens and Portuguese citizens and the principle 
of legality, inherent to administrative law. This case raises other 
fundamental questions. What does a principle mean? Is the conflict 
between the principles of legality and equality admissible in the 
realm of administrative law?4 In other words, does this case raise 
2. Opinion of the Administrative Court Central North No 00490/06.8BEPNF (2007) 
(Portugal), IGFEJ (Feb. 2, 2019), available at 
http://www.dgsi.pt/ jtcn.nsf/89dlcO288c2dd49c8O2 575c8OO3279c7/eb01feOc46f3955 
68025725a005d4381?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,00490 %2F06.8BEPNF%20 
[https://perma.cc/7HJP-ZYKH]. 
3. The Author examined this judgment for the first time for an investigative project 
about the theory of argumentation hosted by the Research Center on Law and Society of 
the Faculty of Law of the Nova University of Lisbon ("CEDIS") back in 2009. After more 
than a decade, the problems raised by the court decision in respect to immigration still 
resonate. For a reference to the investigative work developed by CEDIS, see the following 
link: https://cedis.fd.unl.pt/ [https://perma.cc/4Y3H-SXXD] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020). 
4. The principle of legality (or the rule of law) is a core principle of administrative 
proceedings in most Member States of the European Union. This principle also is a 
fundamental principle of European Administrative Law, which, for the most part, 
reverberates the way French law conceives the principle of legality. For a definition of the 
principle of legality, see J]n Klucka, The General Trends of EU Administrative Law, 41 INT'L 
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a problem of legal and constitutional interpretation, or is it just a 
matter of principle in the sense that the acceptance of a common 
political morality can lead us? 
The Portuguese legal system allows the primacy of the 
principle of legality over the principle of equality even in situations 
when that prevalence may violate the individual's rights, freedoms, 
and guarantees. To understand if the prevalence of the principle of 
legality is justified under the circumstances, the Author follows in 
the footsteps of Robert Alexy and starts from the premise that 
principles are commands of optimization. To this end, she lists the 
following ancillary questions to which she provides an answer 
throughout the text: 
1. What are the interests that the applicable rules protect? 
2. What is the relationship that exists or should exist 
between principles and rules, especially when administrative 
authorities subordinate the right to physical integrity to the 
principle of legality, and that fact, in and of itself, advocates an 
attack to the principles of equity and justice as the sole end of 
the democratic State and any other dimension of morality? 
3. How can a court decision on the merits of an action for an 
injunction only be based on black letter law when there is a 
conflict between the principles of legality and equality that 
undermines the individual's fundamental right to physical 
protection? 
4. Is judicial activism a solution to the problem? 
S. If judicial activism is a solution to the problem, is it a 
reflection or reverberation of a current crisis of legal 
positivism and utilitarian perceptions of the Law?5 
L. 1047, 1048 (2007) (saying that the principle of legality determines that administrative 
authorities act exclusively within limits set up by the law. Furthermore, the Author states 
that "The judicially reviewable principles that limit the autonomy of the administration are 
thus essential guarantees for the respect of the rule of law"). The question in the text 
regarding the apparent opposition between the principles of legality and equality aims at 
exposing that administrative law serves as a playing field for the interaction between 
concordia discordantium principiae. 
S. The Author could ask other questions. For example: what is the role of the civil law 
judge in the application and interpretation of the law? Does the civil law judge have an 
active role in creating the law? If not, should the civil law judge claim it? To what extent 
can judges in the civil law tradition, by assuming a dynamic role within the sources of law, 
decide outside the parameters of the State law? Do civil law judges act ex officio - and, 
therefore, are limited by the normative production of the State - or, using the rationality of 
their arguments, will civil law judges have such legitimacy to construe legal arguments that 
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The Author analyzes how the judge's decision could have been 
different had they adequately weighed or ranked the principles 
and rules of law contained in the legal provisions applicable to the 
case. The Author analyzes this within the rationality and legal 
argumentation of Robert Alexy, and the ideas of morality, integrity, 
and material justice present in Ronald Dworkin's discourse. 
Besides, more than the analysis of the suitability of the norms, the 
analysis of the facts should be the object of a post-positivist 
hermeneutic attitude. There is an implicit context here dominated 
by xenophobic, sexist, moralistic values-the plaintiff is a Brazilian 
woman, and therefore, presumably a prostitute, a subhuman 
category that can be beaten up and that the judge did not scumble 
for purposes of appraising the merit of the plaintiff's pleadings. 
II. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN CONTEXT 
A. Robert Alexy: from practical discourse to legal discourse 
Alexy, unlike authors like MacCormick,6 starts from a theory 
of general practical argumentation to build the structure of the 
legal discourse and argumentation. Thus, legal discourse is 
considered by Alexy as a special case of general practical discourse 
or moral discourse. 7 The classification of legal discourse as a 
go beyond the frontiers of positive law? However, these are prior theoretical problems. 
Moreover: considering the problem under analysis in the text, responding to these 
questions may be even a useless endeavor. Here, the judge does not seem to be creating 
the law. Instead, they are ranking the rules, for which it is enough to resort to hermeneutics 
or constitutional interpretative arguments. 
6. The analysis of other modern theories of argumentation such as those of 
Wittgenstein, Austin, Hare, Toulmin, Stevenson, or Baier is equally compelling. These 
authors have greatly influenced Alexy's scholarship. However, Alexy's theory of 
argumentation places him closer to legal interpretivism alongside authors like Dworkin. 
See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE 
AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 1989) 1978 
[hereinafter ALEXY ARGUMENTATION]. 
7. See id. at 14-15. Providing that legal reasoning is, 
[. .. ] a linguistic activity which occurs in many different situations from 
courtroom to classroom. This linguistic activity is concerned, in a sense yet to be 
more precisely defined, with the correctness of normative statements. It will be 
expedient to designate such activity 'discourse' and, further, since it concerns 
the correctness of normative statements, as 'practical discourse.' Legal discourse 
is a special case of general practical discourse. 
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special case of general practical discourse is crucial to understand 
that both types of discourse are concerned with the correctness of 
normative statements. Legal discourse is a special case because it 
is limited by its own sources such as statutory law, precedents, 
procedure, and doctrine. A legal statement that is correct means 
that it is rationally justifiable despite the limitations of the legal 
discourse. 8 By adopting an "normative-analytical" approach, 9 
Alexy developed a theory of original legal argumentation. Alexy's 
doctrine, which is of Kantian origin and Habermasian inspiration, 0 
intends to create a normative theory of legal argumentation that 
allows to disentangle the good from the bad arguments," and 
allows the analysis of the logical structure of the arguments, 
through the incorporation of empirical elements.12 
But see JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 233 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) stating that, 
one should not conceive legal discourse as a special case of moral discourses 
[...].The procedural principles tested and confirmed in practice and the maxims 
of interpretation canonized in textbooks on legal method will be satisfactorily 
captured in a discourse theory only when the network of argumentation, 
bargaining, and political communications in which the legislative process occurs 
has been more thoroughly analyzed than it has been to date. 
Later on, Habermas points out that, "Although the special case thesis, in one version 
or another, is plausible from a heuristic standpoint, it suggests that law is subordinate 
to morality. This subordination is misleading, because it is still burdened by natural-
law connotations." 
8. ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 16. 
9. Id. at 16. 
10. Id. at 114 (maintaining that "[t]he decisive step for Habermas consists in his claim 
that the 'naturally evolved and internally regulated' language-system on which every 
argumentation rests in the first instance must, in turn, itself be the subject of 
argumentation"). 
11. Id. at 178 providing that, 
To be sure, mere reference to the fact that normative statements are amenable 
to discussion is as yet no conclusive reason for speaking of their amenability to 
justification on their correctness. Such discussions might be no more than 
contrivances for persuading, for exerting psychological influence. The crucial 
question is whether there are criteria or rules for distinguishing good from bad 
reasons, valid from invalid arguments. 
12. Id. at 28-29. 
These analytical investigations would have to be supplemented by empirical 
studies of legal decision-making behaviour. It might be seen as a defect in the 
current work that these things are not attempted here. It is, however, not 
possible for everything to happen at once. It would be enough if the 
investigations presented here could make a contribution to the foundation of a 
theory of rational legal argumentation-a theory which, it is to be hoped, will 
one day be so firmly grounded and so widely developed that it will not only 
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For Alexy and Habermas, the theory of argumentation is a 
theory of procedure. 13 The procedure, that is, the relevant 
decision-making process, may or may not include the possibility of 
modifying the individuals' normative and factual beliefs as well as 
their interests from what those normative and factual beliefs and 
interests looked like at the beginning of the procedure. This theory 
of procedure offers a solution to the so-called "Minchhausen 
Trilemma."14 The procedure Alexy proposes consists of a set of 
semantic and practical rules to avoid what according to Alexy 
would be a real dilemma. Such a dilemma boils down to the 
following fact. The continuous justification of normative 
statements may either lead us to a situation of infinite regress, or 
to a rule that is psychologically and sociologically grounded but 
unamenable to argumentation. 15 Those semantic and practical 
rules that Alexy proposes aim to transform the practical discourse 
into a rational one. 16 However, because the rules of practical 
discourse do not guarantee a solution to an ethical-moral dilemma 
clarify the character of legal science as a normative discipline but will also 
provide practical guidelines for the practicing lawyer. 
Alexy recognizes that "...almost all legal-just as almost all general practical-argument 
forms include empirical elements." Id. at 232. 
13. JURGEN HABERMAS supra note 7, at 237 maintaining that "[t]he legal discourse of 
the court [...] is played out in a procedural-legal vacuum, so that reaching a judgement is 
left up to the judge's professional ability: "With respect to the effect of the reception of the 
evidence, the court decides according to its free conviction obtained from the entire trial." 
The aim is to preserve legal discourse from external influences by moving it outside the 
actual procedure." On the other hand, Dworkin rejects the proposition that, in order to 
demonstrate the rights the parties are entitled to under a hard case, it is necessary to resort 
to a procedure. The argument that "no proposition can be true unless it can, at least in 
principle, be demonstrated to be true" does not include, in particular, the application of 
claims about rights. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (2009). 
14. HANS ALBERT, TRATADO DA RAZAO CRiTICA [TREATISE OF CRITICAL REASONING] 26-28 
(J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) trans., 1976) (1968). 
15. See ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 179. See also KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC 
OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 93-94 (1968). 
16. See ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 179. 
This 'Minchhausen Trilemma' (as H. Albert calls it) is, however, not without 
remedy. It can be avoided by dropping the demand for ever further justification 
of every statement by another statement, in favour of a set of requirements 
governing the procedure of justification. These requirements can be formulated 
as rules of rational discussion. The rules of rational discussion do not relate only 
to statements as do the rules of logic, but reach out beyond them to govern the 
conduct of the speaker. To this extent they can be called 'pragmatic rules.' 
Observance of these rules does certainly not guarantee the conclusive certainty 
of all results, but it does nevertheless mark the results out as rational ones. 
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legal procedure is a way of filling the rationality gaps of the 
practical discourse. Considering the illustration of the problem -
the claim of the Brazilian citizen who was a victim of a crime of 
bodily harm while illegally residing in Portugal -the Author is 
interested in the justification of the Law, from a discursive point of 
view, based on its normative dimension. 
B. Legal Discourse and Argumentation as Means of Rationality. The 
Creation of a General Theory of State and Law 
In the legal discourse, similarly to the moral discourse, there 
is a claim for correction, and the rules of the general practical 
discourse described above are also applied. However, in this 
context, rather than demonstrating the level of rationality of a 
premise, by using the legal discourse the interpreter seeks to 
demonstrate that they can rationally ground a proposition within 
the framework of the current legal order. Consequently, the legal 
discourse has its own rules that impose subjection to the law, to 
propositions, and legal dogma.17 
However, Alexy understands that due to the influence of the 
frailty of the practical discourse in the legal discourse, the 
application of the legal rules inevitably does not result in one sole 
correct solution. 18 We are, in effect, in the dimension of the 
discursively possible. 19 As in practical or moral argumentation, 
also in legal argumentation, discourse participants can rationally 
discuss normative conceptions and implicit values, modify or 
correct such conceptions or eliminate the shortcomings evident in 
the legal system. 
The practical value of a theory of legal argumentation can only 
be revealed in the context of a general theory of State and Law, that 
is capable of uniting the model of the legal system as a system of 
procedures to the model of the legal system as a system of norms. 
17. On the justification of a normative premise or legal decision through internal and 
external justification, see id. at 221-95. 
18. Dworkin goes in the opposite direction, calling those who consider that there are 
no correct answers in the realm of morality or interpretation skeptics. See RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 76-86 (1998); DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 82 (saying "[s]o there is 
no important difference in philosophical category or standing between the statement that 
slavery is wrong and the statement that there is a right answer to the question of slavery, 
namely that it is wrong"). 
19. ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 135-36. 
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The judge that decided the case of the Brazilian citizen was not 
democratically elected. The case challenges the constitutional 
principle of equality. The judgment of the court needs justification. 
Democracies are subject to the rule of majority. However, courts 
lack that democratic legitimacy. So why should court decisions 
take precedence over constitutional principles that are reflection 
of human rights and have been accepted by the People of that 
state? The lack of democratic legitimacy of the courts raises the 
issue of institutional control of the controlling institution-the 
court. Alexy created a system that allows the interpreter to weigh 
constitutional principles. The interpreter's activity is constrained 
by rules of procedure, which means that interpretation also is an 
exercise of state authority. Again, all state authority stems from the 
will of the People. However, one must resist to only attributing a 
decisionistic effect to democracy for it follows the rule of majority. 
Argumentation complements the rules of procedure which courts 
abide by. Thus, the courts' agency is decisionistic and 
argumentative at the same time. Besides the procedural rules, their 
decisions must be grounded in good arguments that are just, 
normatively ideal, correct or rationally justifiable. A general theory 
of State and Law intends to show that the practice of law is not 
foreign to the fact that the normative system also contains 
fundamental rights or principles.20 
IlL BALANCING PRINCIPLES AND THE RULES OF JUDICIAL 
ADJUDICATION 
A. The "Weight Formula" and the prevailing principle 
There are several criteria set forth to distinguish rules from 
principles. 21 Alexy defines principles as "optimization 
requirements," because "they can be satisfied to varying degrees, 
and [...] the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on 
what is factually possible but also on what is legally possible."22 In 
turn, he defines rules as "norms which are always either fulfilled or 
20. See Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, 3 INT'L J. 
CONST. L. 572 (2005); Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Democracy, and Representation, 
3 RICHERCHE GIURIDICHE [LEGAL RESEARCH] 197 (2014). 
21. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 44-47 (Julian Rivers trans., 
2002) (1986). 
22. Id. at 47-48. 
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not." 23 For Alexy, rules have a "definitive character." 24 Alexy 
equates principles with standards that are part of an ideal 
normative dimension, placing the reader on a deontological 
sphere. From now on, the Author focuses on the collision of 
principles. 
The set of principles, rules (and also political guidelines) that 
ground the Constitution do not always converge. Hence, the best 
way to resolve a situation of conflict of interests, that is, when the 
application of both principles seems to be adequate to solve the 
problem, is to weigh those conflicting principles. By following this 
path, the judge will try not to upset, or to upset as little as possible, 
the interests protected by the colliding principles.25 The Author 
focuses on the collision between the constitutional principles of 
equality26 and legality.27 
23. Id. at 48. 
24. Id. at 57. 
25. See, e.g., the case repeatedly cited by Alexy where the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany had to decide if the satirical magazine "Titanic" should be ordered to pay 
compensation in the amount of 12,000 Marcos for having used the term 'n Murderer" 
("geborene morder") in one of its editions, and having used the term "cripple" ("Kriippel") 
in a later edition to address a reserve officer who was paraplegic and had succeeded to be 
called to perform a military duty. In this case, the court had to ponder and weigh two 
fundamental rights-the right to freedom of expression and the right one has to their 
honor. See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 403-04. 
26. Article 13 of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth the following: 
1. All citizens possess the same social dignity and are equal before the law. 2. No 
one can be privileged, favored, prejudiced, prevented from exercising a right or 
exempted from any duty for reasons of their ancestry, sex, race, language, 
territory of origin, religion, ideological, or political convictions, education, 
economic situation, social condition or sexual orientation. 
CONSTITUICAO DA REPOBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 13. 
In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
embodies the principle of equality through the equal protection clause that sets forth that 
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In the doctrine, for a definition of the principle of equality in the 
context of Canada's multiculturalism that comprises different ethnic minorities and 
linguistic heterogeneity, see Terrence Meyerhoff, Multiculturalism and Language Rights in 
Canada: Problems and Prospects for Equality and Unity, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 913, 963 
(1994) (defining the principle of equality as "equality of opportunity for individuals and 
equality in the treatment of, or respect for, groups." Meyerhoff maintains that the principle 
of equality is composed of two elements - one is "freedom from discrimination against 
individuals; the other ... focuses on group survival in the form of assistance for the 
preservation of cultural and linguistic distinctiveness"). 
27. The principle of legality or the rule of law is crucial in administrative law to 
ensure fairness and consistency of the decisions of administrative agencies or authorities. 
See Sydney A. Shapiro, The Top Ten Reasons that Law Students Dislike Administrative Law 
and What Can (or Should) be Done about Them?, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 351, 352 (2000) 
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The interpreter achieves the weighing or optimization of the 
principles through the implementation of the principle of 
proportionality. 28 This principle includes the sub-principles of 
suitability, necessity, and proportionality in its narrow sense. For 
Alexy, "fundamental rights" are principles. Like Alexy, the Author 
will dwell on the concept of principle rather than the concept of 
"fundamental right."29 For Alexy, the core of the balancing process 
lies in the "Law of Balancing."30 The Law of Balancing reflects the 
principle of proportionality in its narrow sense and can be 
formulated as follows: "The greater the degree of non-satisfaction 
of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the 
importance of satisfying the other."31 
The Law of Balancing determines that the interpreter divide 
the balancing process into three stages. The first stage corresponds 
to the definition of the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment 
to a first principle. In the second stage, the interpreter defines the 
importance of satisfying the conflicting principle. In the third stage, 
the interpreter must determine whether the importance of 
satisfying the conflicting principle justifies the detriment to, or 
(maintaining that administrative law is composed of three processes, the study of which is 
highly challenging. He says that "[t]here is the: empowerment process, or the process by 
which the agency receives its authority to make decisions and enforce them; internal 
decision-making process, or the process by which the agency makes its decisions; and 
external control process, or the process by which agencies are made accountable through 
judicial review and through review by elected officials". In all of these processes, statutory 
law more than case law embodies the principle of legality). 
28. The principle of proportionality is set forth by the Portuguese Constitution in 
Article 18(2). CONSTITUICAO DA REPOBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE 
REPUBLIC] art. 18(2). This article maintains that the law may only restrict rights, freedoms, 
and guarantees in the cases expressly provided for in the Constitution. Those restrictions 
must be strictly necessary to safeguard other constitutionally protected rights or 
principles. Id. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences under Federal and 
State Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 48 (2008) (saying that when courts seek to 
enforce constitutional proportionality limits on sentencing (or on other government 
measures), they should only intervene if the burdens on the defendant are clearly 
excessive relative to the benefits, or if alternative sanctions or other measures are clearly 
less burdensome and equally effective). For a critique of the principle of proportionality, 
see Francisco J. Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality, 57 AM. J. JURIS. 49 (2012). 
29. Robert Alexy, Sobre los Derechos Constitucionales a Protecci6n [Regarding 
Constitutional Rights to Protection], in ROBERT ALEXY: DERECHOS SOCIALES Y PONDERACION 
[ROBERT ALEXY: SOCIAL RIGHTS AND BALANCING] 56-57 (Ricardo Garcia Manrique ed., 2007). 
30. See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 50-56, 66-69, 102. 
31. Id. at 102. 
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non-satisfaction of, the first principle.32 To ascertain the specific 
weight of each of the principles, that is, the principle of equality and 
the principle of legality, and which of them is of comparatively 
greater importance, the Author breaks the Law of Balancing down 
into its essential elements and applies the "Weight Formula" to the 
case. 
The degree of non-satisfaction or restriction of one principle 
and the degree or importance of satisfaction of the other can be 
assessed through a Triadic Scale or a model of three intensities-
light, moderate, or serious (1, m, or S). 3 3 
The first object of valuation as 1, m, or s is the intensity of 
interference (1) with a principle (Pi) in a given case (C). Alexy 
assigns the meaning IPiC or Ii to the principle whose restriction or 
infringement is analyzed. The interference with a principle is 
concrete. Therefore, the intensity of interference or non-
satisfaction of that principle has an equally concrete magnitude. 
Nevertheless, to stress the precise magnitude of interference, the 
letter (C) is associated to the meaning provided above referring to 
the circumstances of the case that are relevant to the decision.34 
The second object of valuation as 1, m, or s is the importance 
of satisfaction (S) of the conflicting principle (Pj). The importance 
of satisfaction of the conflicting principle also refers to the concrete 
importance or actual weight of that principle. In line with what the 
Author said on the intensity of interference with Pi, the same can 
now be said of Pj. The concept of concrete importance or weight is 
similar to the concept of the intensity of interference with Pi, 
32. Id. at 105 ("stating that [...] the Law of Balancing is not valueless. It identifies what 
is significant in balancing exercises, namely the degree or intensity of non-satisfaction of, 
or detriment to, one principle versus the importance of satisfying the other"). 
33. ALEXY, supra note 21, at 405. For a critique of these valuation measures, see Jos6 
Juan Moreso, Alexyy la Aritmdtica de la Ponderacion [Alexy and the Arithmetic of Balancing], 
in ROBERT ALEXY: DERECHOS SOCIALES Y PONDERACION [ROBERT ALEXY: SOCIAL RIGHTS AND 
BALANCING] 232-33 (Ricardo Garcia Manrique ed., 2007). 
34. ALEXY, supra note 21, at 405-06. The balancing or weighing of principles Alexy 
engages in reflects his definition of principles as optimization requirements. He weighs 
principles involved in a case. Therefore, balancing which aims to help the interpreter find 
the most correct answer, does not rely solely on a deductive scheme by which the 
interpreter infers the applicable rule. Balancing, which is tied to argumentation, is based 
on the concrete or relative weight of the principles in a case. The circumstances of the 
specific case that are essential for the legal decision refer to the administrative order of 
expulsion from the country of the illegal immigrant who was a victim of a crime, and to the 
consequences which the implementation or non-execution of such order will have on the 
relevant principles under analysis. 
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because it deals with the intensity of a possible interference or 
restriction in the face of non-interference. Therefore, concerning 
Pj, the interpreter can adopt the analogous formula SPjC.35 
What is the degree of interference (I) with Pi and what is the 
concrete importance of satisfaction (S) of Pj, to which the Law of 
Balancing refers? In other words, what is the concrete degree of 
interference with the principle of equality in relation to the 
principle of legality? What is the effect that the non-satisfaction or 
interference with the principle of equality produces in the 
satisfaction or fulfillment of the principle of legality? What kind of 
constraints does the Constitution impose on the principle of 
equality when it provides that the principle of legality is a 
cornerstone of the democratic State? Does satisfying the principle 
of legality justify restricting or not satisfying the principle of 
equality? 
To respond to these questions, the interpreter must take the 
following three steps: (a) evaluate IPiC as 1, m or s; (b) evaluate SPjC 
as 1, m or s; and (c) relate the two previous valuations, by using 
criteria of comparability and, therefore, of commensurability, 
perceived from a common point of view. This common point of 
view is yielded by the Constitution, insofar as it stands for the 
shared feeling of the community. The judge in our case must 
evaluate the principle of equality and the principle of legality by 
resorting to classic criteria of constitutional interpretation. 
Generally, constitutional interpretation does not differ from other 
types of interpretation. However, constitutional rights norms have 
an open texture that challenges the interpreter in their craft. 
The comparability of the principles as outlined above is 
carried out through a "Weight Formula". This formula illustrates 
the structure underlying the Triadic Scale with the help of 
numbers. 36 This formula determines the concrete weight of a 
principle. It reflects the idea that principles become stronger if the 
intensity of their constraint increases. It expands the Law of 
Balancing. It goes as follows: 
WPij C = IPiC/SPjC37 
35. Id. at 406. 
36. Id. at 408. 
37. Id. 
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In our case, the interpreter measures the concrete weight (W) of 
the principle of equality (Pi) by the effects the non-interference 
with the principle of legality (Pj) has on the principle of equality. 
Put differently, the higher the weight of the principle of legality in 
a concrete case, the more restrictive the principle of equality will 
be.38 
The Weight Formula determines that the concrete weight of a 
principle be obtained through the quotient of the intensity of 
interference with this principle (Pi) and the concrete importance 
of the competing principle, (Pj). The concrete weight of a principle 
is, therefore, a relative weight, which is expressed by the formula 
Pij. The concrete weight of Pi is the concrete weight of Pi relative 
to Pj.39 
Here, the Author shall refer to the Weight Formula to 
determine the intensity of the restriction on the principle of 
equality (Pi). By ascertaining the intensity of interference with the 
principle of equality, the Author will be able to assess the actual 
weight of the principle of equality and the importance of the 
principle of legality (Pj). 
The author allocates the values 20, 21, and 22, that is, 1, 2, and 
4 to the three values of the Triadic Scale (1, m, and s) and applies 
such numbers to our case.40 This way, the Author can verify that 
the order of expulsion of the foreign citizen interfered with the 
principle of equality (Pi) on the basis of value 4 (s). On the contrary, 
that order of expulsion interfered with the principle of legality (Pj) 
on the basis of value 1 (1).41 Hence: 
s, 1 = 4 / 1 = 4 
However, let us consider the contrary situation-that is, the 
interpreter restricts the principle of legality (Pj) based on value 4, 
and restricts the principle of equality (Pi) based on value 1. 
1, s = 1 / 4 = 1 / 4 
38. Id. at 408-09. 
39. Id. at 409. 
40. Id. at 409-10. 
41. ALEXY, supra note 21, at 410. Indeed, the basis of the restriction value of the 
principle of legality should be null, since the decision of the Immigration and Border 
Services, subsequently confirmed by the "courts a quo and ad quem", merely applied the 
law qua tale. Nevertheless, the Author lets the values presented in the formula to guide her 
for she deems them sufficient to demonstrate what the Author intends. 
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This scenario allows us to conclude that the principles (Pi) 
acquire a higher concrete weight when the intensity of their 
restriction increases on minor grounds.42 Inherent to this idea is 
the impression that principles increase their resistance as the 
intensity of the interference with them increases. Why? Because 
the resistant core of fundamental rights with the structure of 
principles manifests itself whenever it faces an interference. In this 
context, the more the interpreter interferes with the core of the 
right to equal treatment deriving from the principle of equality, the 
higher is the resistance of the principle of equality to that 
interference.43 
In respect to the case under analysis, it is important to ask the 
following. Is there a disproportionate interference with the 
principle of equality considering the weight of the principle of 
legality?44 What effect do the constitutional provisions that "[a]ll 
citizens have the same social dignity and are equal before the 
law"45 and "[f]oreigners and stateless persons who are or reside in 
Portugal enjoy the rights and are subject to the duties of the 
Portuguese citizens"46 have on the principle of legality? 
In the case at hand, the restriction of the principle of equality 
was disproportionate. The Weight Formula demonstrates that 
disproportionality. The degree of protection the interpreter 
afforded to the principle of legality was higher than the protection 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 424 (stating that "[...] as interference with a constitutional right increases, 
so also does [...] its substantive resistance"). 
44. It should be noted that the concrete importance of Pj (the principle of legality) is 
measured by the degree of the intensity of the interference with Pj as a result of the non-
interference with Pi. In other words, the lower the interference with Pi, the higher the 
interference with Pj. Take, for example, the conflict that frequently arises between the right 
to honor and the right to freedom of expression. Although these are two fundamental 
rights, Alexy treats fundamental rights as principles. Thus, the present considerations 
apply both to fundamental rights and principles. Ifa judge considers that there is a reason 
not to restrict the right to honor given the circumstances of the case, then the right to 
freedom of expression will be restricted as a result of the non-restriction of the right to 
honor. Thus, the importance of the principle of legality arises from the calculation of the 
intensity of its restriction resulting from the non-restriction of the principle of equality. 
45. Article 13 (1) of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth that "[a]ll citizens possess 
the same social dignity and are equal before the law". CONSTITUICAO DA REPOBLICA 
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 13(1). 
46. Article 15 (1) of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth that "[f]oreigners and 
stateless persons who find themselves or who reside in Portugal enjoy the same rights and 
are subject to the same duties as Portuguese citizens." CONSTITUICAO DA REPOBLICA 
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 15(1). 
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they gave to the principle of equality. The interpreter did not 
interfere with the principle of legality by interfering with the 
principle of equality. The intensity of the interpreter's interference 
with the principle of legality was lower for their interference with 
the principle of equality was much higher. 
The court restricted the principle of equality based on an idea 
of protection of the public interest and the public order. The 
Author does not believe that the reasons that led to the 
interference with the principle of equality were stronger than the 
reasons justifying the non-interference with the principle of 
equality. The rights that foreign nationals have to have the same 
rights Portuguese citizens enjoy extended to them because those 
foreign nationals share the same social dignity and have the right 
to not to be discriminated against the law justify the non-
interference with the principle of equality. While reading this case, 
the Author adopts a universalist perspective that bears its stand 
from the idea that the interpreter should read legal and 
constitutional provisions in line with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.47 This sort of interpretation pays tribute to the fact 
that fundamental rights are not subject to political bargaining or 
loose judgments. They must and can be exercised by any person 
regardless of their citizenship or nationality. In this respect, it is 
essential to analyze the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which requires that Contracting Parties secure, recognize, and 
observe the human rights and fundamental freedoms of every 
person under their jurisdiction,48 and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.49 Article 1 of the Charter sets forth 
that "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and 
protected." 
However, Alexy's assertiveness is infinite because he does not 
consider the system of precedence between principles as stagnant. 
Weighing allows the interpreter to move toward correctness and 
obtain more truth, but not all the truth. This incompleteness is a 
reality because the system of precedence between principles can 
47. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
48. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
49. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 
O.J. (C364). 
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subside. That system will subside insofar as those who intend to 
undertake such a modification argue accordingly. (Again, we are in 
the realm of the discursively possible). 50 Their discourse must 
respect the limits of practical argumentation, legal argumentation, 
and the model of rationality of the democratic rule of law. 
B. Ronald Dworkin: Principles or a Question of Principle? The 
Interpretative Model and the System of Monological Rationality -
Hercules, the Judge. 
Alexy, like Dworkin, considers that the difference between 
rules and principles is essentially conceptual or qualitative and not 
one of degree or commensurability. 51 Hence, the Author has 
chosen to compare Alexy and Dworkin. As she reads Dworkin's 
work, she realizes how Dworkin invokes profound moral 
principles that underlie the idea of equality of all. He understands 
the principle of equality as equal concern and respect. He almost 
treats it as a self-evident truth, which is in line with his 
understanding that there may be one single right answer to a hard 
case. Equal concern and respect for your fellow citizen would be 
the correct answer. 
In a democracy, numbers count. However, in Dworkin's view, 
democracy represents more than the majority rule. 52 At a 
conference at the University of Nebraska in 2008, Dworkin 
lectured on democracy, religion, and relations between the United 
States of America and Israel (referring to themes such as Zionism 
and immigration). Therein, he reiterated an idea that has been 
widely reproduced in his scholarship -- "democracy must be a 
partnership that allows each citizen over whom the nation claims 
dominion and from whom it extracts allegiance to see the 
government as his government, and that [...] is not possible unless 
the government shows to each citizen equal concern and equal 
50. ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 135-36. 
51. See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 48 (saying that " [...] the distinction between rules 
and principles is a qualitative one and not one of degree. Every norm is either a rule or a 
principle"). 
52. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 177 (1986) (stating that "[w]e might think 
that majority rule is the fairest workable decision procedure in politics, but we know that 
the majority will sometimes, perhaps often, make unjust decisions about the rights of 
individuals"). 
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respect."53 Accordingly, the rights of those groups often referred to 
as "minorities"-thus categorized by criteria such as race, 
ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, and religion-
must be indisputably protected. 
This appeal to the protective role of the state derives from 
Dworkin's personification of the state and the community, which, 
in his work are treated as moral agents, that like the partnership 
or the corporation have a separate personality from their 
members. The implication of this personification is the creation of 
an associative obligation 54 between the members of that 
community from which it derives a social responsibility of each 
member to feel outraged whenever state officials do not treat 
every single member of that community with the equal 
consideration and respect they deserve. He maintains that: 
Once we accept that our officials act in the name of a 
community of which we are all members, bearing a 
responsibility we therefore share, then this reinforces and 
sustains the character of collective guilt, our sense that we 
must feel shame as well as outrage when they act unjustly.55 
In that talk he gave at the University of Nebraska in 2008, 
Dworkin uttered that a Democracy must show equal concern and 
equal respect for its citizens. However, he clarified that a 
Democracy does not need to show equal concern for every person 
who would like to be a citizen. No nation opens its doors to all those 
who would like to come, he said.56 Indeed, the government of a 
State may not adopt an immigration policy nor have it as a priority. 
However, the State cannot fail to act with respect for those upon 
53. Democracy and Religion: America and Israel, MEDIAHUB, 
https://mediahub.unl.edu/media/546 [https://perma.cc/YLZ2-R5UJ] (last visited Apr. 1, 
2020) [hereinafter Democracy and Religion]. 
54. RONALD DWORKIN, supra note 52 at 196 (defining associative obligations as 
the special responsibilities social practice attaches to membership in some biological or 
social group, like the responsibilities of family or friends or neighbors." These are 
obligations that one does not necessarily deliberately choose to accept them. The duty to 
honor our responsibilities under social practices that define groups and attach 
responsibilities to membership depend on conditions of reciprocity. The members of the 
group must regard those obligations as special and personal. The members must 
understand their responsibilities as stemming from their concern for the well-being of 
others in the group. That concern must be equally shown for all members of the group. 
These associative communities are political communities. Id. at 198-202). 
55. RONALD DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 175. 
56. See Democracy and Religion, supra note 53. 
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whom it exercises and claims to have dominion, even if to 
maintain: "our law does not apply to you." At the very least, the 
State cannot do so in a way which shows complete disrespect for 
the fundamental rights of those citizens. 
The neuralgic point of Dworkin's critique of the utilitarian 
theses and positivist conceptions of authors such as Jeremy 
Bentham, John Austin, and, in particular, Herbert L. Hart, lies in the 
realization that respect for individual principles and rights, which 
can be used as trumps against the state because they are prior to 
the State, binds judicial decisions.57 He, therefore, adopts an anti-
Archimedean stand. He refutes the existence of a fixed point, 
outside of common morality, through which it would be possible to 
leverage a response to a question in the context of a normative 
debate. 
The theory of adjudication that Dworkin develops is based on 
an interpretative model of adjudication. He bases his model on a 
metaphor-Hercules, the judge.58 It is an ideal mythological figure, 
endowed with superpowers because Hercules is part of the 
historical reality of a community in which it shares the idea of 
morality. Alone, Hercules evaluates the fundamental principles of 
that community, within the scope of an adjudication process 
created by himself. 
The interpretation Hercules undertakes should conceive Law 
as integrity. That is, the judge, when analyzing the applicable 
norms, should try to understand what their best justification will 
be from the point of view of political morality.59 By doing this, the 
judge must undertake a constant dialogue with history. Like the 
interpreter in the context of Alexy's theory of legal argumentation 
who aims to find the correct answer contextually, Dworkin's 
Hercules aims to find the principle that spells out the right thing to 
57. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 233-39 (1977) (using the case of 
reverse discrimination to criticize utilitarian arguments. Utilitarian arguments rely on 
policies that are understood to make the community as a whole better off, even if they are 
discriminatory. Pursuant to the author, "[i]f we want to defend individual rights in the 
sense in which we claim them, then we must try to discover something beyond utility that 
argues for these rights"). Id. at 271. 
58. RONALD DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 239. 
59. Id. at 225. (explaining that "[t]he adjudicative principle of integrity instructs 
judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they 
were all created by a single author - the community personified - expressing a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness"). 
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do. However, unlike the cases adjudicated by the interpreter in 
Alexy's theory of legal argumentation, for certain cases which 
Hercules must adjudicate, there is one correct answer only, which 
is not subject to commensurability. 
The Author also sees Dworkin's interpretive model of 
adjudication in light of a set of other metaphors: law works itself 
pure; there is a higher law, within and yet beyond positive law, 
toward which positive law grows; law has its own ambitions.60 All of 
these metaphors acknowledge that judicial decisions or legislative 
acts change the law to a certain extent. Let us take as an example 
the petition of the Brazilian citizen who claimed the annulment of 
the order of expulsion from the Portuguese territory. If we link the 
decision of the judge to order the expulsion of the Brazilian citizen 
to those three metaphors, we can draw one of the following 
conclusions. 
The change of the Law is inherent to a decision in favor of the 
annulment of the order to expel a foreign citizen whose physical 
integrity was violated. The decision of the court to annul such 
order of expulsion would produce a change in the law because the 
right to reside illegally in the country is not explicit in the 
Constitution. However, if the interpretative argument in favor of 
the annulment of the order of expulsion is a good argument, then, 
the Law itself advocated for that change. The Law fulfilled its own 
ambitions. A change of Law through adjudication is not neutral, but 
rather an improvement of the Law itself, in the sense that a pure or 
fair law is a better law. The change of the Law is a clarification of 
what the Law already is. If better interpretation of the Law results 
in the adjudication of a constitutional right to a certain citizen, 
denying that right is the same as denying the opportunity for the 
improvement of the Law. It is also a denial of the Law itself. 
In the case under scrutiny, there are several things at stake. 
The right of a foreign citizen who illegally resides in the country, 
but over whom the State exercises its jurisdiction, to be treated in 
the same way as a national citizen would if they were a victim of a 
crime is at stake. The right of that foreign citizen to be protected by 
the relevant guarantees of the laws of the criminal procedure 
without having to undergo a test of confirmation of her situation in 
the country is at stake. The right of that foreign citizen to be 
60. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Ambitions for Itself, 71 VA L. REV. 173, 173 (1985). 
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protected by the relevant rules of criminal procedure that prevent 
the judge from using inadmissible evidence is at stake.61 The right 
of that foreign citizen to equal consideration and respect lies on the 
political belief that no citizen should have those rights put at stake. 
The idea of integrity derives from the political ideal that the 
community we live in is a principled one. 
When the moment to decide comes, Hercules should ponder 
which of the principles that that political community embraces 
they should apply to the case.62 Dworkin believes that when there 
is a conflict of principles whereby political guidelines clash on the 
one hand, and individual rights and guarantees collide on the 
other, the moral perspective must prevail. 63 In this context, the 
prevalence of the moral standpoint is a matter of principle. 
C. Hermeneutics and the Process ofAdjudication: Hercules and the 
Perception of the Other 
From the above, a piece of evidence stands out: in Dworkin's 
doctrine, hermeneutics assumes a fundamental role. There is 
significant opposition between the current legal order and another 
one, of an altruistic nature, of solidarity and openness to the 
61. Article 32 (8) of the Portuguese Constitution maintains that [... ] all evidence 
obtained through torture, coercion, the offense to the physical or moral integrity of the 
individual, improper intromission into the individual's personal life, home, 
correspondence or telecommunications is void. CONSTITUIAO DA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA 
[CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 32 (8). Article 126(1) of the Portuguese 
Criminal Procedure Code substantiates the constitutional provision and sets forth a list of 
inadmissible evidence. C.P.P. art. 126(1). The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States sets forth that "No person shall be [... ] compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
62. Dworkin does not show how the court should act to ponder this. Nevertheless, 
the judge must analyze each principle and ask what principles and political guidelines offer 
a better justification of the Law. The judge must ask the following question: What 
interpretation of the Law based on the wording of the relevant legal provisions best serves 
those principles or political guidelines? 
63. In our case, principles rather than political guidelines are at issue because the 
judicial decision to expel the foreign citizen from the country was based on the application 
of the terms of the law rather than the implementation of a political statement. In our case, 
the point is to understand whether there is a reason for the prevalence of the principle of 
legality over the principle of equality, from the moral standpoint. In the quest for the 
solution to this conflict, the interpreter will ignore the political guidelines that might have 
determined the enactment of the relevant legislation. 
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Other. 64 In postmodern States, or states that are situated in a 
"liquid modernity," the need for openness to the Other is pressing. 
Hermeneutics recognizes this need.65 Thus, in addition to being a 
neo-constitutionalist, Hercules should be hermeneutic. 
What does it mean to be a foreign citizen in the eyes of the 
administrative authorities and in the eyes of a judge? A possible 
answer can be found through the adoption of a discursive-
interpretative approach to understand the world that surrounds 
us; through our historical context, and language to approach the 
past. However, the discourse adopted must be pragmatic, open, 
and capable of breaking with the traditions and preconceptions on 
which we base our finitude, our indigence, our partiality, and our 
previous involvement. 
Essentially, defining the meaning of foreign citizen is the same 
as questioning the prejudices that bind us as a condition of access 
to knowledge. Providing such definition involves the immersion 
into a profound process of psychoanalysis, the voluntary 
submission to a Freudian treatment for the recovery of prejudice, 
through dialogue, discourse, and presentation of arguments to 
respond to the problems of the present. Looking for that meaning 
is what the judge in our case should have done. They should have 
questioned all existing preconceptions (including the legal ones) 
and presented arguments that would show, in the context of an 
action for an injunction, the judge's necessary sensitivity to the 
way the expulsion process had been triggered. The judge in our 
case should have proceeded in this manner not because the 
plaintiff-defendant was a Brazilian citizen, but because she was a 
foreign citizen, who was denied protection under the principle of 
equality. If no national citizen would have been denied that 
protection under the same circumstances, then neither should that 
foreign citizen face that denial. 
64. ANTONIO MANUEL HESPANHA, 0 CALEIDOSCOPIO DO DIREITO: 0 DIREITO E A JUSTICA NOS 
DIAS E NO MUNDO DE HOlE [THE KALEIDOSCOPE OF LAW: LAW AND JUSTICE NOWADAYS IN THE 
WORLD TODAY] 476 (2d ed. 2009). 
65. Essentially, the Author refers to philosophical hermeneutics. On this matter and 
for a preliminary approach, see Zygmunt Bauman, The Challenges of Hermeneutics, in THE 
BAUMAN READER 125-138 (Peter Beilharz ed., 2001); Odo Marquard, The Question, To What 
Question Is Hermeneutics the Answer, in FAREWELL TO MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDIES 111 (Robert Wallace trans., 1989) (1981). 
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IV THE CREATION OFA GENERAL THEORY OF STATEAND LAW: 
CONCLUSIONS 
What is the value of fundamental rights and freedoms 
assigned to national and foreign citizens in light of the rule of law 
and the democratic state? Has the interpreter fulfilled the principle 
of the rule of law and the democratic state through an inflexible 
conception of the principle of legality? Are administrative 
authorities justified to deprive citizens, regardless of their 
nationality, of the constitutional protection afforded to their most 
fundamental rights and freedoms? 66 How far can or should 
administrative authorities go? How far can or should the judge go? 
How far can or should the State go? What is the fate of the foreign 
citizen? 
Administrative authorities, while following criteria of 
efficiency, competence, and promptness in their responses to the 
claims of the citizens, must not fail to treat any individual as the 
human being they are. Thus, the interpreter should be open to 
reinterpreting the principle of legality and separation of powers. It 
is vital that besides their executive power, administrative 
authorities can fill in the gaps in the interstices of the law. It is 
crucial that the public administrator, as well as the judge, can intuit 
the correct answer (regarding the case at hand, the Author 
assumes her skepticism) to the case. That level of intuition 
requires the assumption of a more intense relationship with the 
law and accepts that the interpreter cannot reduce Law to only one 
positive set of rules; the Law also contains principles. 
The interpreter must recognize that constitutionally 
consecrated rights are influential beyond the State-citizen 
relationship. The interpreter must recognize the "radiating effect" 
these rights have on the overall legal system.6 7 No agnosticism is 
justified here. Thus, what is essential for the resolution of our case 
66. In the text, the Author is referring to fundamental rights and freedoms such as 
the right to life, personal identity, citizenship, freedom of religion, etc. 
67. See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 352, citing the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany: 
[A]ccording to the long-standing case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court, 
constitutional rights norms do not simply contain defensive rights of the 
individual against the state, but at the same time they embody an objective order 
of values, which applies to all areas of law as a basic constitutional decision, and 
which provides guidelines and impulses for the legislature, administration and 
the judiciary. 
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and other similar cases is to learn the way the judge should 
interpret and apply the constitutional provisions to the case. 
As part of public administration, the conduct of the members 
of law enforcement was unacceptable from a constitutional point 
of view. In addition to the principles of equality and justice, the 
principle of impartiality68 determines that their actions towards 
citizens (whether they are foreigners or not) be exempt, objective, 
neutral, and independent. The principles of equality, justice, and 
impartiality also determine that citizens subject to administrative 
proceedings be acknowledged the right to know why is it that, in 
those circumstances, they cannot be treated in the same way any 
national would have if that national had been a victim of a crime of 
offense to their physical integrity. The need that citizen has to be 
informed implies that administrative authorities provide public 
criteria for assessing the context. In our case, members of law 
enforcement should have felt compelled to explain the context that 
prompted them to ask that Brazilian citizen for her passport as a 
condition precedent to her filing of a criminal complaint, when 
they knew that such request would probably render the relevant 
criminal proceedings unenforceable. 
The respect for the principles of equality and proportionality 
determines that foreign citizens cannot be denied fundamental 
rights to which national citizens also are entitled. If such denial 
occurs, it must lie on rational arguments. The principle of equality 
also encapsulates the right to judicial protection. Accordingly, 
denial of justice to a foreign citizen through administrative 
procedure restricts the principle of effective judicial protection. 69 
The principle of effective judicial protection yields the adoption of 
precautionary measures that safeguard the effectiveness of the 
action. The principle of effective judicial protection also prevents 
fundamental rights or legally protected interests, which the 
plaintiff-defendant meant to protect through the action she filed, 
from getting seriously and irreparably injured. 
68. Article 266 (2) of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth that administrative 
agents are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law and must act with respect for the 
principles of equality, proportionality, justice, impartiality, and good faith. CONSTITUIAO DA 
REPOBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 266(2). 
69. Article 20 of the Portuguese Constitution foresees the right to effective judicial 
protection and Article 268(4) lists a number of rights and guarantees constitutionally 
provided to citizens who deal with administrative authorities. CONSTITUIAO DA REPOBLICA 
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] arts. 20, 268(4). 
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The correct resolution of the case that illustrates this text is a 
matter of principles, for which denial the judge did not find good 
reasoning. The interpreter can only give real existence to the rule 
of law and the informing principles of the democratic state by 
undertaking a correct interpretation of the law. They can achieve 
that by following rules of procedure that control their legal 
argumentation and by interpreting the law based on criteria of 
integrity and in line with the applicable constitutional norms. The 
constitutional interpretation that pays tribute to the ideals of 
integrity, coherence, and correctness will allow the realization of 
the rule of law and the democratic state. That interpretation will 
allow the creation of a general theory of the State and Law. The 
most fundamental constitutional principles will strengthen that 
theory to its core. 
In the words of Habermas: 
If one shares Dworkin's deontological understanding of law and 
follows the argumentation-theoretic considerations advanced by 
such authors as Aarnio, Alexy, and Gfinter, one will agree with two 
theses. First, legal discourse cannot operate self-sufficiently inside 
a hermetically sealed universe of existing norms but must rather 
remain open to arguments from other sources. In particular, it 
must remain open to the pragmatic, ethical, and moral reasons 
brought to bear in the legislative process and bundled together in 
the legitimacy claim of legal norms. Second, the rightness of legal 
decisions is ultimately measured by how well the decision process 
satisfies the communicative conditions of argumentation that 
make impartial judgment possible.70 
70. JURGEN HABERMAS, supra note 7, at 230. 
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